The Critique of Conceiving Logic as a Propadeutic :: Logic Ontology Philosophy Essays

The Critique of Conceiving Logic as a Propadeutic Introduction: Does logic assume an ontology? What is the relationship between logic and ontology? In contemporary philosophy common answers have been ‘No’ to the first and ‘None’ to the second question. This is because the principles of logic, to borrow Kantian terminology, are understood as regulative rather than constitutive of objects. For a principle to be regulative means that it provides us with a methodology that belongs somehow to the nature of our thinking, but not to that of the world, as constitutive principles do.[i] In this way, a regulative conception of logic represents logic as an â€Å"instrument† of reason that takes for granted a formal set of rules, rules which have no bearing on â€Å"reality† and that are â€Å"invented† as tools to guide our thought.[ii] It is no curiosity that as a result most contemporary logic text-books present logic as formal or informal system of rules meant to regulate our thinking. But why s hould we presuppose that logic is a regulative â€Å"instrument† devoid of ontological status? The aim here is to show that this presupposition regarding the nature of logic has very tenuous grounds and that a more plausible conception is a constitutive one, where logic is seen to express the structure of the world as mathematics might. This will be argued first by articulating Kant’s arguments for the separation of logic and ontology based on his criticism of pure reason and logic as providing principles constitutive of objects. Next, a Hegelian criticism of this criticism will be provided, as a defence of pure reason, to present subsequently his conception of reason and logic as the fountain of constitutive principles. This will be attempted by showing (a) Hegel’s conception of logic, (b) of thought, and (c) of objective thought. Finally, this position will be challenged with the charge of psychologism to show that nonetheless an ontological view of logic is more plausible than a regulative one. I. Kant: Finite Experience and The Critique Of Pure Reason 1.1. The Regulative Logical Employment of Reason Kant’s first Critique is an impressive analysis of the theoretical mind, an attempt to discover its nature, capacity for knowledge, and limits.